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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

CARRIE M. CARTER,

/

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

/
/

RAYMOND D. KINGSFORD and
TRANSNATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

/
/
/
/

vs.

Defendants and
Respondents.

Case No.

14516

/
/

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the appellant, the
plaintiff in the Lower Court, against the respondents to
set aside a release of liability entered into between appellant and a representative of respondent, Transnational Insurance Company, and to recover damages resulting from an automobile accident with respondent, Kingsford.

Appellant alleges

the release should be set aside on the grounds that a mutual
mistake of fact induced its execution.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was driving her automobile westbound on
24th street approaching the intersection with Orchard Avenue

in Ogden on April 26, 19 71.

The respondent, Raymond D.

Kingsford, was driving eastbound on 24th Street, approaching
the same intersection when he began making a left turn in
front of the appellant when a collision occured, with resulting injuries to the appellant and damage to her vehicle.
(R-23).

Following the accident, and until the execution of

the release on July 14, 1971, appellant was under medical
treatment of her family physician, David P. Jahsman, M.D. (R-28).
On July 14, 19 71, after Dr. Jahsman informed appellant that all
x-rays taken of her neck and shoulder were normal and she had
no other injuries, (R-lll) appellant executed the release with
Transnational Insurance Company without seeking advice of counsel
(R-29) and received a settlement of $3,334.09. (R-135).
Subsequently, in September of 19 72, appellant
developed headaches and a numbness in her right arm which
again required her to seek the aid of a physician. (R-112).
Appellant was treated by Dr. Jahsman until November, 19 74,
when a neurosurgical consultation with Dr. C. D. Van Hook
for the first time showed appellant had suffered a cervical
herniated disc.

(R-14).

In January 1975, a surgical inter-

vention was necessitated requiring fusion of C5-6, which Dr.
Jahsman stated was proximately necessitated by reason of the
accident of 1971.

(R-121).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT, HAVING NO AWARENESS OF SERIOUS
SPINAL INJURY, CANNOT BE HELD TO BE BOUND BY A RELEASE OF
LIABILITY.
Dr. David P. Jahsman treated appellant for a
"Cervical Contusion", or bruise to her neck, from the date
of the accident until she was authorized to return to work
(R-120).

Appellant executed a release six (6) weeks after

the accident only after being told by Dr. Jahsman she only
had a neck strain, that all x-rays taken were normal, i.e.,
that she did not have any other medical problems (R-112).
Dr. Jahsman's report is further indicative of this fact
when he notes that there was no indication or reason for a
prognosis of the need for possible surgical repair for
plaintiffs injury (R-121).
In granting respondents Motion for Summary Judgment,
the Court concluded, without benefit of any testimony, that
"There is no way of knowing exactly if appellant's discs
were herniated during the accident..." (R-114).

Additionally,

the Court, after noting appellant was treated for a stiff
neck, concluded this was synonomous with her having knowledge
that she had a herniated disc (R-114).
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In Reynolds vs Merrill,

460 P2d 323, (1969) , plaintiff was injured when a car
rear-ended the one he (plaintiff) was operating.

The

plaintiff was treated for bursitis for two and one half
(2%) months prior to signing a general release of liability.
Subsequently, plaintiff continued to suffer from reoccuring
pains.

After numerous inconclusive tests were given,

plaintiff was finally referred to an orthopedic specialist
and at that time the injury was finally diagnozed as a
herniated disc which was subsequently fused.

The trial

court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing
the complaint because of the release.

In reversing that

ruling, the court noted, at page 324:
"The trial court believed that the plaintiff
had lost all rights against the defendant by
reason of the release given, and he entered a
Summary Judgment dismissing the complaint. In
doing so, he failed to distinguish between an
unknown injury and unknown consequences of a
known injury. The former can be the basis of
a mutual mistake of fact, while the latter
would be only a mistake of opinion."
The case under current consideration is very
similar to the Reynolds case.

In both the Reynolds case

and this one, plaintiffs were treated by family physicians
who, after a limited period of time informed their patients
they had nothing of a serious nature wrong with them.
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In

each case, this information from the treating physicians
induced the signing of the releases.

In each case, after

the releases were signed, physical symptoms developed which
finally led the original treating physician to refer the
plaintiffs to orthopedic specialists.
specialists diagnosed

In each case, the

herniated discs as the cause of the

problems and spinal fusions were performed resulting in
permanent partial disability.
It is submitted that the main difference between
the cases, is that in the present case the plaintiffs injury
was diagnosed as a bruise to the neck, while in the Reynolds
case, it was diagnosed as bursitis.

This Court held that

in Reynolds, at page 326:
"In the instant case the plaintiff does not
contend that he should have the release set
aside if it is shown that he actually intended
to settle for all injuries. He here is asking
for a day in court to establish, if he can,
that there was a mutual mistake of fact regarding the injury which actually was in existence but which was unknown to both him and
the insurance adjuster."
POINT II
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN GRANTED TO RESPONDENT WHEN FACTS BEFORE THE COURT
PRESENT TRIABLE ISSUES.
The appellant submits to the Court that Motion
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for Summary Judgment should not have been granted to the
respondent.

This Court in often stated positions on the

granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment has reasoned
itfs only where it is perfectly clear that there are no
issues in the case, that Summary Judgment is proper.
In Dupler vs. Yates, 10 Ut.2d 251, 351 P.2d 624
(1959), this Court stated at page 636:
"Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is
not intended to provide a substitute for
the regular trial of cases in which there are
disputed issues of fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends, and it should
be invoked with caution to the end, that
litigants may be afforded trial where there
exists between them a bona fide dispute of
material fact."
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Samms vs.
Eccles, 11 Ut.2d. 289; 358 P.2d. 344:
"That some claims may be spurious, should not
compel those who administer justice to shut
their eyes to serious wrongs and let them go
without being brought to account. It is a
function of Courts and Juries to determine
whether claims are valid or false. This
responsibility should not be shunned merely
because the task may be difficult to perform."
and finally, in Frederick May & Company, Inc. vs. Dunn,
13 Ut.2d 40, 368 P.2d 266, (1962), this Court stated:
"To sustain the Summary Judgment, the pleadings,
evidence, admissions, and inferences therefrom,
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viewed most favorably to the loser, must
show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and that the winner is
entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law.
Such showing must preclude as a matter of
law, all reasonable possibility that the
loser would win if given a trial."
CONCLUSION
It is submitted to this Honorable Court that the
iiower court erred in granting respondents Motion for Summary
Judgment in that there were questions of fact at issue basic
to a final rendering of Judgment in this action.
Appellant executed the release only after being
informed by the treating physician that all x-rays were
normal and that she only had a stiff neck and shoulder.
Her belief that she had no other injuries induced her to
execute the release without her knowledge of the herniated
disc which was not discovered until an orthopedic specialist
examined her.

Questions of fact which should be determined

at trial are whether the disc was herniated in the accident,
or was a result of gradual degenerations and whether or not
her knowledge that she had a bruised neck should be equated
as knowledge on her part of a herniated disc.
Appellant is asking for the opportunity of proving
that at the time of signing the release she had a herniated
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disc which neither she nor the insurance adjuster new about;
that the herniated disc was an unknown injury and not a
known injury with unknown consequences.

Respectfully submitted,

Z/&*^j£f^/&-,
iS^u

jJ^KEITH HENDERSON
Attorney for Appellant
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